PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STmUCT

LIABILITY IN TORT-STATE-OF-THE-

CAsEs-Beshada v.
Johns-ManvilleProducts Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
ART DEFENSE INAPPLICABLE IN DESIGN DEFECT

Failure to warn of the dangerous propensities of a product sounds
in both negligence and strict liability.' In a negligence action for
2
failure to warn, defendants may assert a state-of-the-art defense,
which will exculpate a manufacturer or seller of an injury-causing
product if the dangers were scientifically undiscoverable at the time
the product was marketed. 3 Thus, when a claim of negligence is
asserted, a defendant manufacturer has not breached his duty of
reasonable care if the danger was undiscoverable. 4 In strict liability,
however, knowledge is imputed to the manufacturer since the focus is
5
on the safety of the product, not on the conduct of the manufacturer.
In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,6 the Supreme Court of

See Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,
462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). But see Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.
1969) (little, if any difference between strict liability and negligence theories in warning cases).
Negligence theories have been successfully applied in failure to warn cases when the
manufacturer has provided no warning at all or when the warning given was inadequate. M.
KRONISCH,

Theories of Liabilities, Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 9, 11 (S. Birnbaum & P.

Rheingold eds. 1980). Under a theory of strict liability, however, a manufacturer and/or seller
may be found liable for injuries caused by a defective product regardless of his exercise of
reasonable care in the preparation of that product. Id. at 13-14. Many jurisdictions consider
inadequate warnings or instructions sufficient to render the product defective, thus triggering
the imposition of strict liability. Id. at 14.
2 See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969). One definition of the stateof-the-art is "the aggregate of product-related knowledge which may feasibly be incorporated
into a product." Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals: The State Of The Art Defense, 43
ALa. L. REv. 941, 946 (1979). Evidence of the state-of-the-art may be introduced to prove that a
defendant was not negligent or that its product was not defective. Id. at 945. Additionally, it has
been found that subsequent technological improvements of a product are inadmissible to prove
negligence. Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 959
(1965).
Generally, the concept of foreseeability performs a function similar to that of a knowledgebased defense. Foreseeability limits the scope of the manufacturer's duty to risks which could
have been discovered by applying existing human knowledge. See, e.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 202, 447 A.2d 539, 545 (1982). The
plaintiff must introduce evidence that this knowledge was available at the time the goods were
manufactured. Id. at 203, 447 A.2d at 546.
4 See supra note 2.
5 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204, 447 A.2d 539, 546 (1982)
("[I]n strict liability cases, culpability is irrelevant"); see also Freund v. Cellofilm Properties,
Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 238, 432 A.2d 925, 929 (1981); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
N.J. 150, 169, 406 A.2d 140, 149 (1979).
6 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:625

New Jersey determined the appropriateness of the state-of-the-art
7
defense in the context of strict liability for failure to warn.
Beshada involved six consolidated personal injury and wrongful
death actions against manufacturers and distributors of asbestos. 8 The
plaintiffs were employees or survivors of deceased employees who
alleged injury from asbestos exposure. 9 Due to the long latency period
preceding the manifestation of asbestos-related diseases 0 such as asbestosis" and mesothelioma,12 causes of action have only recently
arisen from exposure dating back to the 1930's.13 Although the plaintiffs urged many legal theories in support of their claims for damages,' 4 the appeal arose out of the strict liability claim for "failure to
warn." 1 5 The plaintiffs claimed that at the time of their exposure, the
Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
8 Id. at 197-98, 447 A.2d at 543. A total of 59 plaintiffs were involved in the consolidated
suits. Id.
IId.
10A latency period of approximately 20 years is associated with asbestosis, mesothelioma,
and broncogenic carcinoma. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451
F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mich. 1978). "This latent period is explained by the fact that asbestos fibers,
once inhaled, remain in place in the lung causing a tissue reaction that is slowly progressive and
apparently irreversible." Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir.
1973); see Selikoff, Bader, Bader, Churg & Hammond, Asbestosis and Neoplasia, 42 AM. J. MED.
487 (1967); Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation
Workers, 132 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. ScI. 139 (1965). See generally R. GRAY, 4A ATTORNEYs' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE A 205c.72 (1981).
11 Asbestosis is a nonmalignant scarring of the lungs. 90 N.J. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542. See
generally supra note 10.
12 Mesothelioma is a form of lung cancer caused by exposure to asbestos which affects the
pleural and peritoneal cavities. 90 N.J. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542. See generally supra note 10.
3 90 N.J. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542.
1' See id. at 196-97, 447 A.2d at 542.
15 Id. Although the defendants claimed that they were unaware of the dangers of asbestosis,
there is considerable dispute about the knowledge which the defendants had and when they
acquired that knowledge. The Beshada court noted that in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
509 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Tex. 1981), the trial judge concluded that "[k]nowledge of the danger
can be attributed to the industry as early as the mid-1930's." 90 N.J. at 197, 447 A.2d at 542
(quoting Hardy, 509 F. Supp. at 1355). In 1924, an English researcher discovered asbestosis in a
person who had worked 20 years in an asbestos textile mill. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 n.4 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Cooke, Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to the
Inhalation of Asbestos Dust, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 147 (1924)). In the United States, the first official
claim for compensation associated with asbestos was made in 1927. Lanza, Asbestosis, 106 J.
AM. MED. A. 368 (1936). In addition, the asbestos industry, led by Johns-Manville, commissioned the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in the early 1930's to investigate and determine
the relationship between asbestos exposure and the high rate of pulmonary disease encountered
among workers in the asbestos mines and factories. R. SWEENEY, The Asbestos Time Bomb,
Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 103, 104 (S. Birnbaum & P. Rheingold eds. 1980).
The defendants asserted in Beshada that it was not until the 1960's that the medical
profession in the United States recognized that a potential health hazard arose from the use of
insulation products containing asbestos. 90 N.J. at 197, 447 A.2d at 542. The court chose not to
resolve the factual issues raised. Id.
7

1983]

NOTES

defendants failed to provide warnings, handling instructions, or safety
equipment.
The defendants raised a state-of-the-art defense,16 asserting that
at the time the asbestos was marketed no one knew that the product
was dangerous.' 7 Therefore, the only knowledge that could be imputed to them was the knowledge that existed at the time of manufacture, 8 thereby precluding any inference that they knew of the dangerous propensity of the product."9 Since they could not have known that
the product was dangerous, the defendants argued that it was unreasonable to impose a duty to warn of the unknowable, 20 and that their
actions were reasonable in marketing the asbestos without a warning.21 In response, the plaintiffs moved to strike the state-of-the-art
defense2 2 on the grounds that when claims are brought in strict liability, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant knew that the
product was dangerous, since this knowledge is imputed.2 3 The key
issue presented, therefore, was whether the presumed unawareness of
the dangers of a product by the scientific and medical community is a
24
defense in strict liability for failure to warn.
The trial judge denied plaintiff's motion to strike the state-of-theart defense, 25 concluding that the defendants' "knowledge" of the
harmful propensities of their products was a rebuttable presumption
which could be overcome by evidence that the danger was "unknowable" at the time of manufacture.2 6 A motion for leave to appeal the
27
trial court order was subsequently denied by the appellate division.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted the plaintiff's motion for
direct certification to appeal the interlocutory order of the trial

IS 90 N.J. at 197, 447 A.2d at 542. The Beshada court described the state-of-the-art defense
in a warning case as relieving distributors of liability for injuries caused by dangers undiscoverable at the time of manufacture. Id. at 202, 447 A.2d at 545.

17

Id.

1sId.

at 199, 447 A.2d at 543. The defendants argued that Freund v. Cellofilm Properties,
Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 955 (1981), imputed to defendants only the existing technological
knowledge at the time of manufacture. 90 N.J. at 199, 447 A.2d at 543.
" 90 N.J. at 199, 447 A.2d at 543.
20 Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
21

Id.

Id. at 197, 447 A.2d at 543.
Id. at 198-99, 447 A.2d at 543. The plaintiffs argued that Freund disposed of the state-ofthe-art issue since defendant's knowledge of the dangerous propensities of the product is imputed, thereby making it irrelevant whether such dangers were discoverable. Id.
24 Id. at 197, 447 A.2d at 542.
25 Id. at 199, 447 A.2d at 543.
22
23

26 Id.
27

Id.
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court. 28 In a unanimous decision, 2 the court held that a state-of-theart defense would not be allowed in strict liability for failure to
warn,30 and that the knowledge which existed at the time of trial
rather than that which existed at the time of manufacture is im31
puted.
While courts generally agree that a manufacturer has a duty to
produce safe products and to warn of any known inherent dangers in
the product, 32 there has been little conformity concerning what, if
anything, should be the difference in the criteria for strict liability in
the various types of design defect cases. 33 Beshada was rendered
against the framework of design defect liability established by Cepeda
v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 34 Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Machine Co., 3S and Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc.38
In Cepeda, the court distinguished design defects from manufacturing defects. 37 A design defect was defined as a condition "where the
product is made as intended, but is asserted to be dangerous in some
way, ' 38 and a manufacturing defect as "a variance, latent or patent,
from the manufacturer's intent. ' 3 The court noted that in manufacturing defect cases, prima facie liability for physical harm resulting

Id.
Id. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549. Beshada was a unanimous 6-0 decision. Justices Pashman,
Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, and Sullivan, and Judge Matthews joined in the opinion. Chief
Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford and Schreiber did not participate. See id.
30 Id. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542.
31 Id. at 203, 447 A.2d at 546.
12 See generally W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (1971). This duty is based on a
responsibility to protect the ultimate consumer from defective goods. A defect may be any
irregularity in the manufacture or design which renders the product unsafe or may be the failure
to warn itself. Id. § 99, at 659-60; see also Keeton, Product Liability And The Meaning O
Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30 (1973); Wade, On The Nature Of Strict Tort Liability For
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 841-43 (1973).
33 See supra note 1.
34 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
35 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
36 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
37 76 N.J. at 169, 386 A.2d at 824. The plaintiff in Cepeda lost four fingers while operating a
pelletizing machine with a bolt-on-finger guard removed, and sued the manufacturer for negligence and breach of warranty. Id. at 160, 386 A.2d at 820.
31 Id. at 169, 386 A.2d at 824; see also Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281
(1972) (failure to provide safety device on punch press rendered machine defective and unreasonably dangerous). As a standard for design defects, the court adopted the "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous" language of § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs (1965). 76
N.J. at 171-72, 386 A.2d at 825. This language was rejected by the Suter court the following
year. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
39 76 N.J. at 169, 386 A.2d at 824; see also Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d
599 (1975) (defectively manufactured steering wheel); Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J.
582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974) (defectively manufactured automobile accelerator).
28
29
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from the defect arises, since the product is unreasonably dangerous 40
as a matter of law. 4' The Cepeda court explained, however, that in a
design defect case the standards for determining liability in negligence
and strict liability are identical except that in strict liability, the
foreseeability of the dangerous propensity of the product is imputed to
the manufacturer. 42 Since the manufacturer is charged with this
knowledge, the inquiry becomes whether the defendant was reasonable in marketing the product. 43 In answer to this inquiry, the court in
Cepeda adopted a risk-utility analysis 44 in which the benefits of the
product's design and marketing are balanced against the product's
45
danger existing at the time of trial.
The following year the court in Suter stated that a manufacturer
will be liable for injuries46 caused by a product if at the time of
distribution the product is not "reasonably fit, suitable and safe" for
its intended purpose. 47 By adopting this standard, the court rejected
40 76 N.J. at 170, 386 A.2d at 824. The Cepeda court stated that the manufacturer would be
liable 'if the product left their hands in a defective condition proximately causing the mishap.' "Id. at 171, 386 A.2d at 825 (quoting Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 590,
326 A.2d 673, 680 (1974)).
4 76 N.J. at 170, 386 A.2d at 824 (citing Keeton, supra note 32, at 39).
42 Id. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825. The court adopted the explication of strict liability offered by
Dean Wade in which the scienter is supplied as a matter of law and need not be proven by
plaintiff as a matter of fact. Id. at 172, 386 A.2d 825 (citing Wade, supra note 32, at 834-35).
43 Id. at 172-75, 386 A.2d at 825-26. The Cepeda court referred to the seven factors proposed
by Dean Wade for evaluating the seller's reasonableness in marketing the product.
"(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting
the price of the product or carrying liability insurance."
Id. at 174, 386 A.2d at 826-27 (quoting Wade, supra note 32, at 837-38).
11 Id. at 172-75, 386 A.2d at 825-27.
15 Id. at 173, 386 A.2d at 825.
48 In this design defect action, the plaintiff's hand was injured when it was caught in the
cylinders of an industrial sheet metal rolling machine which was not equipped with a kill switch
to prevent false starts. The trial court charged the jury on the theory.of strict liability. Suter, 81
N.J. at 154, 406 A.2d at 141-42.
47 Id. at 169, 406 A.2d at 149. This definition was approved by the Beshada court. See
Beshada, 90 N.J. at 201, 447 A.2d at 544.
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the "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" language of section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which they had relied
upon in Cepeda.48 Applying the risk-utility analysis developed in
Cepeda, the court in Suter stated that the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions should be examined in light of the "technological
feasibility of manufacturing a product whose design would have pre49
vented or avoided the accident, given the known state of the art."
The court in Freund applied the principles of strict liability
enunciated in Cepeda and Suter to a factual setting involving an
inadequate warning.50 Writing for the court, Justice Handler noted
that "where the design defect consists of an inadequate warning" as to
safe use, the utility of the product, as counterbalanced against the
risks of its use, is rarely at issue 5' because a warning can make a
product safer at virtually no added cost and without limiting the
product's utility. 52 The court stressed that a warning should "be sufficient to protect adequately any and all foreseeable users from hidden
dangers presented by the product." '5 3 Furthermore, the court noted
that the duty to warn attaches "without regard to prevailing industry
standards" and that a strict liability charge should not be riddled with
references to negligence, knowledge, and reasonable care on the part
of the manufacturer.5 4 As a result, the Freund court held that a strict
liability charge must focus on safety and affirmed the Cepeda and

18 81 N.J. at 173-75, 406 A.2d at 151-53. This modification removed from the plaintiff the
burden of proving there was a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." The product must
be safe to use in reasonably foreseeable environments. A product which does not meet this
standard is defective as a matter of law. Id. at 169, 406 A.2d at 149.
19 Id. at 171-72, 406 A.2d at 150. According to Keeton, when applying the risk-utility test
"[u]nder the heading of benefits one would include anything that gives utility of some kind to the
product; one would also include the infeasibility and additional cost of making a safer product."
Keeton, supra note 32, at 37-38.
o The plaintiff in Freund suffered serious injuries when utilizing a product known as
nitrocellulose. Plaintiff sought recovery in negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty
contending that the defendant marketed a dangerous product without providing a proper
warning. 87 N.J. at 233-34, 432 A.2d at 927.
51 Id. at 242, 432 A.2d at 929.
52 Id. The Beshada court analogized warnings and automobiles unequipped with seatbelts:
Because of the great utility of cars, few would dispute that even without seatbelts, a
car's utility to society outweighs its risks. Thus, cars would be considered safe under
the first aspect of the test. However, since seatbelts make cars safer without hindering utility, cars without seatbelts are deemed unsafe by virtue of the second part of
the Freund test. Warnings are like seatbelts: regardless of the utility and risk of a
product without warnings, a warning can generally be added without diminishing
utility.
90 N.J. at 201 n.5, 447 A.2d at 545 n.5.
87 N.J. at 241-43, 432 A.2d at 929-31.
Id.
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Suter proposition that knowledge of the dangerousness of the product
5
is imputed to the manufacturer.
Justice Pashman, writing for the Beshada court, adopted the
Suter definition of strict liability, stating that the Cepeda risk-utility
equation must be applied when determining whether a product is
"reasonably fit, suitable and safe." 5 6 The Beshada court approved the
distinction between negligence and strict liability set forth in Freund,
wherein the court noted that "negligence is conduct-oriented, asking
whether defendant's actions were reasonable; strict liability is product-oriented, asking whether the product was reasonably safe for its
foreseeable purposes." 57 Following the Cepeda rationale, the Beshada
court further held that in strict liability actions alleging design defects,
the foreseeability of the dangerous propensity of the product, as manifested at the time of trial, is imputed to the manufacturer. 58
The Beshada court recognized that warning cases constitute one
category of strict liability cases 59 and identified Freund as the leading
case in this area. ° The court applied the two-prong test enunciated in
Freund to determine whether a product is safe: "1) does its utility
outweigh its risks? and 2) if so, has that risk been reduced to the
greatest extent possible? . . .,,61 Under the first part of the test, if the
risk outweighs the utility of the product, strict liability can be imposed
without determining whether the product could have been made
safer.62 If a product passes the first part of the test, however, it will
not be deemed reasonably safe if it could have been manufactured
more safely.6 3 The Beshada court noted that the second part of the test
is of particular importance in warning cases, as a warning can make a
64
product safer without hindering utility or adding cost.
Imputed knowledge distinguishes strict liability from negligence. 5 In Beshada, the disputed issue was not whether knowledge is

I Id.; accord Shatz v. TEC Technical Adhesives, 174 N.J. Super. 135, 148-149, 415 A.2d
1188, 1195 (App. Div. 1980).
56 90 N.J. at 199, 447 A.2d at 544.
57 Id. at 200, 447 A.2d at 544 (adopting Freund, 87 N.J. at 238, 432 A.2d at 929-30).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 201, 447 A.2d at 544-45.
60 Id. at 202, 447 A.2d at 545.
6I Id. at 201, 447 A.2d at 545 (adopting Freund, 87 N.J. at 238 n.1, 432 A.2d at 930 n.1).
82 Id.
60 Id. The Beshada court stated that "[i]n actuality, the only test for product safety is
whether the benefit outweighs the risk." Id. at 201 n.4, 447 A.2d at 545 n.4.
64 Id. at 202, 447 A.2d at 545.
65 Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825. In strict liability it is no longer necessary to prove
that the seller had or should have had any personal knowledge of the hazards known to the
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imputed, but rather, whether knowledge at the time of manufacture
or at the time of trial is imputed.6 6 The defendants contended that the
technology available at the time of distribution should act as a limitation on the determination of whether a product could have been made
safer.6 7 Absent this limitation, argued the defendants, liability would
be absolute since a product would be judged according to a constantly-improving standard of technology. "8
The defendants in Beshada contended that a warning was not
feasible within the meaning of the Freund standard that risk be
reduced "to the greatest extent possible" because of the scientific
unknowability of the dangers of asbestos at the time of distribution.6 9
The defendants agreed that knowledge is imputed in strict liability,
but they construed Freundas imputing only known dangers existing at
the time of manufacture or sale. 70 The court agreed that Freund had
not directly addressed this question, but stressed that a state-of-the-art
defense is a negligence defense, 7 ' and its application in failure to warn
cases would contravene the principles annunciated in Freund.72 To
preclude any allusion to the conduct of the manufacturer, the court
stated that since "culpability is irrelevant" in strict liability, the focus
73
is on the product, not on the conduct of the manufacturer.
According to the Beshada court, the primary purpose of strict
liability "is to compensate victims of defective products. ' 74 In light of
this purpose, the defendant's argument that the duty to warn should
be limited to knowable dangers was found unpersuasive by the

scientific community. Id. The plaintiff need only show that the defect existed and that " 'the risk
created by the dangerous condition of the product was outweighed by the social utility attained
by putting it out in this fashion.' " Id. at 172, 386 A.2d at 826 (quoting Wade, supra note 32, at
834-35); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text. See generally Wade, Strict Tort Liability
of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
88 90 N.J. at 202-03, 447 A.2d at 545-46.
67 Id. at 202, 447 A.2d at 545.
68 Id.

" Id. at 203, 447 A.2d at 546.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
72 Id. Justice Pashman rejected the defendants' interpretation of Freund as creating an
illogical dichotomy in warning cases. Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547. The court deemed untenable
the defendants' position that if the danger were discoverable they would be liable for failure to
warn even if they were not negligent in failing to discover it, whereas if the danger were
undiscoverable, they would suffer no liability. Id.; see Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy
Of Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 398, 408 (1970); see also supra notes 20 & 21 and accompanying
text.
73 90 N.J. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546; accord Keeton, supra note 72, at 408.
74 90 N.J. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
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court. 75 The court noted that "[t]he most important inquiry . ..

is
whether imposition of liability for failure to warn of dangers which
were undiscoverable at the time of manufacture will advance the
7
goals and policies sought to be achieved by our strict liability rules."
The court discussed three policy considerations which are relevant to
this inquiry: simplification of the fact-finding process, risk spreading,
and accident avoidance."
In discussing simplification of the fact-finding process, the court
indicated that proof of scientific knowability in a trial setting would
be too complex, costly, confusing, and time consuming. 78 In addition,
because the state-of-the-art is affected by the amount of industry
investment in safety research, 79 further determination would be required as to whether the defendants' conduct had contributed to
making the dangers unknowable.8 0 The resolution of this issue would
result in a battle of experts,"' increased legal costs, and consequently
"great difficulties . . . in a courtroom." 812 The court further expressed
the concern that a jury might interpret the concept of state-of-the-art
83
as a question of fault for not knowing of the danger of the product.
The court observed that this would constitute negligence, which was
discredited as a liability theory in design defect cases.8 4 Accordingly,
the court concluded that tort trials would be simplified by denying the
85
defendants' state-of-the-art defense.
On the concept of risk spreading, Justice Pashman stated that
manufacturers can effectively allocate the cost of injuries caused by
defective products by incorporating the cost of insuring against liability into the cost of the product. 8 The defendants argued that since
unknowable risks are by definition unpredictable, there is no effective
method of adjusting the price of products to reflect this potential
75 Id.

11Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547.
See id. at 205-08, 447 A.2d at 547-48.
Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
71 Id. at 208, 447 A.2d at 548. Manufacturers which do not invest in product safety research
create an artificially low level of state-of-the-art knowledge. Id.
80 See id. at 207-08, 447 A.2d at 548.
1 Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548. Experts in the history of science and technology would be
required to speculate as to what knowledge was feasible at a given time in the past. Id.
812Id. at 208, 447 A.2d at 548.
83 Id.
84 See id. at 208, 447 A.2d at 548-49; see Freund, 87 N.J. at 243, 447 A.2d at 932; see also
Keeton, supra note 72, at 409.
85 90 N.J. at 207-09, 447 A.2d at 548-49.
" Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547. The court maintained that liability from unreasonable risks
should be a cost of doing business. Id.; see W. PnossEn, supra note 32, § 75, at 495; Keeton, supra
note 72, at 408.
77
78
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liability.87 Instead, the defendants asserted that these costs would be
shifted to the consumer since manufacturers would be faced with
"across the board" increases in their insurance premiums.8 8 The Beshada court recognized that the defendants' predictions were possible,
but indicated that "it is not a bad result."' 89 First, the court stated that
there was no rational basis for distinguishing between unknown and
unknowable risks since knowledge is imputed in both instances. 0
Second, the court asserted that the costs of injuries from a defective
product should be placed on those responsible for introducing the
product into the stream of commerce, rather than on the innocent
victim. 91 Finally, the court dismissed the defendants' contention that
risk spreading would increase production costs and consumer prices
beyond the level of economic efficiency."
In considering the concept of accident avoidance, the Beshada
court noted that responsibility for "accident costs and accident avoidance costs" is best placed on the manufacturer.9 3 By imposing strict
liability for failing to discover dangerous propensities of a product,
and therefore for failing to warn, the court indicated that it was
4
attempting to create an incentive for more active safety research .
The court reasoned that this goal would be advanced by imposing
liability for failure to warn even though the dangers were undiscover5
able at the time of manufacture.
The law of strict liability in design defect cases evolved from
manufacturing defect cases in which liability is imposed, regardless of
the exercise of due care. 96 Inadequate safety devices,9 7 inadequate

87 90 N.J. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90

Id.

91 Id.

Id.
Id. at 206-07, 447 A.2d at 547-48 (citing Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972), quoted in Suter, 81 N.J. at 173-74, 406 A.2d
at 151-52).
11 Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
92

13

05 Id.

" See Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (defective wheelchair);
Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975) (defective steering wheel); Scanlon
v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974) (defective automobile accelerator);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (defective steering
wheel); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963) (defective airplane altimeter). See generally W. PRossEe, supra note 32, § 99, at 661.
" Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
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warnings,9 8 and failure to warn of known dangers"9 are examples of
design defects. Since the dangerous propensity of the product is recognized in these cases, it is proper to apply the product-oriented standard associated with manufacturing defect cases. In Freund, the manufacturers were aware of the product's risk and were capable of making
the product safer; therefore, the court correctly borrowed the product-oriented standard applied in manufacturing defect cases.
The court in Freund relied upon Phillips v. Kimwood Machine
Co.' 00 in determining that strict liability is product-oriented, rather
than conduct-oriented.' 0 ' The Phillips court, however, imputed the
dangerousness of the product but noted that "[t]he question of
whether the design is unreasonably dangerous [(i.e., defective)] can be
determined only by taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances and knowledge at the time the article was sold." 1 02 In extending the product-oriented standard to claims predicated on failure to
warn of unknown dangers, 10 3 the Beshada court relied heavily on
04
Freund.1
Freund, however, was an inadequate warning case
wherein the defendant admitted knowledge of the hazard and placed
a warning on the product., While it is reasonable, therefore, to
impose strict liability for failing to update a warning to include dangers discovered prior to the occurrence of an injury, the Beshada
court's application of strict liability for failing to warn of dangers
which were unknowable at the time of manufacture and injury is
logically unsound.

Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
See supra note 32.
100269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
lO See Freund, 87 N.J. at 238, 432 A.2d at 929; accordJackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co.,
499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974). But cf. Phillips, 269 Or. at 498, 525 P.2d at 1039 (in
determining the dangerousness of product, "assume the seller knew of the product's propensity to
injure . . . and then . . . ask whether, with such knowledge, he would have been negligent in
selling it without a warning").
102269 Or. at 498, 525 P.2d at 1037.
10190 N.J. at 204-09, 447 A.2d at 546-49; accord Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp.,
98
09

91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982). In Michalko, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reaffirmed that
claims brought in strict liability for design defects include failure to warn of known or unknown
dangers and inadequate warnings and are thus analyzed according to the product-oriented
standard. Id. at 394, 451 A.2d at 182-83. The court held that "an independent contractor who
undertakes to rebuild part of a machine in accordance with the specifications of the machine's
owner can be held strictly liable for breach of its legal duty to the machine's foreseeable users to
make the machine safe or to warn of the dangers inherent in its use." Id. at 403, 451 A.2d at 18788.
104See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
105Freund, 87 N.J. at 243, 432 A.2d at 932.
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Historically, courts have struggled to place limitations on the
imposition of strict liability. One limitation is the risk-utility analysis
which exculpates a defendant manufacturer if the utility of the product outweighs its inherent risks. Another limitation on the imposition
of strict liability on sellers is the requirement that the danger be
reasonably foreseeable or scientifically discoverable.10 6 By imputing
knowledge of the dangerous propensities of a product existing at the
time of trial, the Beshada court has adopted a hindsight standard for
imposing liability on manufacturers. 0 7 Although Dean Keeton was
cited in Beshada as favoring the imputation of knowledge manifested
at the time of trial,1 08 Keeton has expressed his opposition to the
application of a hindsight standard in cases involving post-distribution
9 Obligating manincreases in knowledge of risk-reducing measures. 10
ufacturers to warn of the unknown and the unknowable transforms
the manufacturer into an insurer against all injuries, even though the
danger could not have been discovered by human skill and foresight. "10 This approach, in effect, imposes absolute liability on manufacturers for design defects. "' The Beshada court cited Dean Wade in
support of its decision," 2 however, as Wade explains, the purpose of
"[s]triet liability for products is clearly not that of an insurer. If it
were, a plaintiff would need only to prove that the product was a
101Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973); see Karjala
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[olf course, a manufacturer
is only required to warn of foreseeable dangers").
107In Jackson v. New Jersey Mfg. Ins. Co., 166 N.J. Super. 448, 400 A.2d 81 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 81 N.J. 330, 407 A.2d 1204 (1979), the appellate division refused to hold a
successor manufacturer strictly liable for failing to incorporate design features which were not
within the state-of-the-art at the time of sale but were developed 40 years after the machine had
been sold. Id. at 463-64, 400 A.2d at 88-89. The court concluded that the defect would have to
be determined as of the date of sale and that the subsequently developed state-of-the-art could
not establish a prima facie case under strict liability. Id.; accord Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 193, 386
A.2d at 836; see Lynch v. Caller Seven-Up Pre-Mix Corp., 74 N.J. 146, 152, 376 A.2d 1211, 1214
(1977) (per curiam); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 7-8, 342 A.2d 181, 184
(1975). See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R. 3d 1079 (1974).
108See Beshada, 90 N.J. at 200, 447 A.2d at 544.
Io
See Keeton, The Meaning of Deject In Product Liability Law-A Review Of Basic
Principles,45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 595 (1980).
110Wade, supra note 32, at 828. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 32, § 99; Freedman,
"Defect in the Products: The Necessary Basis For Products Liability In Tort And In Warranty,
33 TENN. L. REv. 323 (1966); Keeton, supra note 32; Rheingold, Proof Of Defect In Products
Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325 (1970); Wade, Strict Tort Liability Of Manufacturers, 32
ALA. LAW. 455 (1971).
1I See Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059, 1063-64 (Alaska Sup. Ct.
1979) (criticizing approach which holds manufacturer liable for unknowable defects since "no
indication of danger exists and no techniques for obtaining such information are available, [thus]
a manufacturer has no basis for concluding that the product should not be marketed").
"2 See 90 N.J. at 200, 447 A.2d at 544.
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factual cause in producing his injury."' 3 It appears, therefore, that
the Beshada court has gone beyond the scope of strict liability as
delineated by the scholarly authority upon which it relied.
It is also questionable whether this hindsight standard adopted in
Beshada promotes the public policy objectives underlying strict liability in design defect cases. 1 4 One reason enunciated for imposing strict
liability was that those engaged in manufacturing can best spread the
risk by accepting these losses as a cost of doing business. 15 When there
is an extended period of time between manufacture and injury, as in
latent design defect cases, many companies go out of business, thereby
inequitably spreading the risk and loss among those companies remaining. The Beshada court also suggested that the cost of potential
liability can be absorbed by insuring against this risk and by incorporating the cost of insurance into the price of the product." 6 This
assumption is unwarranted in latent design defect cases in which the
injury-causing products were sold many years ago. The prices of
products manufactured decades ago did not reflect the cost of potential injuries, and insurance premiums at the time did not reflect
unknowable risks. Furthermore, product liability insurance is becoming scarce, and rising premiums for unanticipated risks have virtually
rendered it unattainable.1 7 The result will be across-the-board increases in the costs of new products as manufacturers bear the costs
prospectively. There is a point, however, beyond which a marketplace will not tolerate additional price increases to "pay the premiums" as manufacturers are forced to assume an insurer's liability. The
resulting decrease in business carries a concomitant threat of stagnation in research and development and, consequentially, an arrest in
technological improvement.
Accident avoidance is another rationale articulated for the imposition of strict liability in design defect cases. "1 Since the state-of-the-

Wade, supra note 32, at 828.
See generally supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
11
90 N.J. at 205, 447 A.2d at 546; see Wade, supra note 32, at 826; see also Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
90 N.J. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547.
1 BUREAU OF DOMESTIC COMMERCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE: ASSESSMENT OF RELATED
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES PAPER No. PB-252, 204 (1976); see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d
828 (1942); Keeton, Products Liability-Some ObservationAbout Allocation 0f Risk, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966); Keeton, supra note 32, at 34; Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel
(Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960).
11 90 N.J. at 206-07, 447 A.2d at 547-48.
113
114
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art is determined to a great extent by industry investment in safety
research, the Beshada court indicated that strict liability would create
an incentive for manufacturers to increase product safety.I1 9
The hindsight standard of Beshada does not encourage a manufacturer to test a product after distribution because a subsequent
discovery of danger would constitute prima facie evidence that the
product was defective when it was sold. A manufacturer will not feel
compelled to invest additional capital in research if it will be held
strictly liable for unknowable dangers discovered decades later, regardless of the standard of care exercised. Instead, the fear of discovering a harmful characteristic in a product will encourage a "waitand-see" attitude marked by increased product costs to cover
premiums. The possibility of total economic annihilation by a single
group of claims is awesome. 20 This threat encourages technological
stagnation since new safety discoveries carry the threat of future
liability. Accordingly, "the desire to reduce accidents justifies shifting
losses to a maker only if he could have eliminated a danger that ought
2
not to have existed." ' '
The Beshada court justified striking the state-of-the-art defense to
simplify the plaintiff's proofs and to avoid jury confusion, thereby
advancing simplification of the fact-finding process. 22 Although striking the state-of-the-art defense may advance this policy justification of
strict liability, 23 it adversely affects fundamental fairness during litigation. In effect, the decision precludes a manufacturer from conducting a meaningful defense during trial, thus converting manufacturers
into absolute insurers of their products.

" Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
120On August 26, 1982, facing 16,500 lawsuits filed by disabled workers who had been

exposed to asbestos and with new lawsuits being filed at the rate of 500 per month, Manville
Corporation filed for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Manville is not
the first asbestos company to file for bankruptcy. UNR Industries of Chicago filed in July, 1982
under the burden of 17,000 asbestos damage claims. See Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 12, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 1.
121 Keeton, supra note 32, at 34; see id. at 30-34.
12 90 N.J. at 207-08, 447 A.2d at 548.
123 The Beshada court additionally noted that simplifying the plaintiff's proofs furthers the
ultimate goal of compensating injured consumers. Id. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549. The court stated:
"We impose strict liability because it is unfair for the distributors of a defective product not to
compensate its victims." Id.; accord Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63,
377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962) ("The purpose of [strict] liability is to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves"); see Birnbaum, Unmarking The Test For Design Deject: From Negligence To
Warranty To Strict Liability To Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 596 (1980).
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The underlying rationale of Beshada-1. defendant is a better
risk spreader; 2. defendant is responsible for product safety research;
and 3. the fact-finding process of tort trials should be simplified-is
equally applicable in cases involving drug manufacturers. 124 Beshada,
therefore, raises questions concerning the continued vitality of the
adoption of the Restatement (Second) of
New Jersey appellate court's
25
Torts § 402A comment k.1
Comment k recognizes that prescription drugs are "unavoidably
unsafe products" and immunizes drug manufacturers from liability if
their products are properly prepared, marketed, and accompanied by
adequate warnings and directions. 2 6 The concepts of fault and foreseeability are key elements in determining liability under the negligence standard of comment k.12 7 The state-of-the-art defense, there-

124 Subsequent to Beshada, the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories, No. A-4428-79-TI (N.J. App. Div.), to the appellate division for that court to
reconsider its summary affirmance of the trial court's dismissal in light of Beshada. The parties
were directed to address, inter alia, whether the state-of-the-art defense remained available in
pharmaceutical products liability actions.
125 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has never explicitly adopted comment k although the
court affirmed the appellate court's application of this provision in Brody v. Overlook Hospital,
127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 390 (App. Div. 1974), afj'd, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975), and
subsequently in Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 162 N.J. Super. 145, 392 A.2d 600 (App.
Div. 1979), af'd, 82 N.J. 321, 413 A.2d 315 (1980).
126 The applicable standard of liability in cases involving prescription medicines is set forth in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the
Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and
damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to
a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified,
notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be
sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time
and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of
safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is
justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable
risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it,
is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful
and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id.
127 See Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 337 (D. Md. 1975), afJ'd, 567 F.2d 269
(4th Cir. 1977) (defendant manufacturer held not liable for inadequate warning of potential side
effects of oral contraceptives since company had warned against all adverse side effects which
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fore, is vital to the presentation of a meaningful defense by
pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Public policy considerations mandate that the negligence standard embodied in comment k continue to govern drug liability cases.
The policy behind comment k is the desire to encourage the development and marketing of medicines, even when there is a medically
recognizable risk due to "lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience" to insure safety or purity. 128 While no medicine is
free from adverse toxic effects on certain users, 1 9 the same drugs often
save countless lives. By making manufacturers liable for even unforeseeable effects which may arise after the use of a drug, the development of new drugs becomes financially risky. Without the state-ofthe-art defense, insurers will exclude coverage of many new and
existing drugs in policies or drastically increase premiums to cover
unanticipated liability. 130 Faced with potentially crippling liability, it
is foreseeable that manufacturers would reduce research and development, thereby decreasing pharmacological advances and the availability of new drugs to the public.'13 Additionally, drugs which a
manufacturer decided to market would require even more arduous
testing than is presently required.1 32 Thus, costs would escalate and

were scientifically knowable at time of ingestion); Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326
(1981) (under comment k there can be no strict liability when charge of inadequate warning is
based on subsequent technological advancements); Ortho Pharmaceutical v. Chapman, 388
N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (court rejected imputing the knowledge of the dangerous
hazards of birth control pill to manufacturer and held that comment k requires proof that
manufacturers had knowledge of danger).
128 See supra note 126. Since some adverse effects of a drug do not appear until years after
ingestion, evaluation of a medicine must continue into the period of clinical use. See L. GOODMAN & A. GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 30 (4th ed. 1970).
129 See L. GOODMAN & A. GILMAN, supra note 128, at 25.
130 Joint Brief of Amici Curiae on behalf of Eli Lilly & Co., Pfizer, Inc., Warner-Lambert
Co., Abbot Laboratories, E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., The Upjohn Co., Schering Corp., Emons
Indus., Burroughs Wellcome Co. at 42, Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, No. A-4428-79-TI
(N.J. App. Div.).
"I See id. at 34-36.
132 Presently there are eight stages of testing involved in the process of obtaining Food and
Drug Administration approval for a new medicine.
1. Discovery. This stage involves basic research syntheses of new medicines and
studies of chemical properties to identify new medicines for further study.
2. Preclinical Animal Testing. After the discovery of a new medicine, shortterm animal toxicity studies are performed in order to determine safety for human
testing.
3. Investigational New Drug (IND) Filing. If preclinical studies are favorable,
a request is made to the FDA for authorization to begin human testing. If the FDA
feels further testing is warranted, an investigational exemption-an IND-is
granted.
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scientific response to new diseases would be delayed. The increased
costs resulting from increased testing and unforeseeable liability will
undoubtedly be passed on to the consumer. Given today's economic
realities, price increases in pharmaceutical products may render medical treatment unaffordable for many.
The scientific and pharmacological advances in the past several
decades have helped improve the quality of life by eliminating disease
and by easing pain and suffering.' 33 These advances give hope for
many others afflicted with uncommon diseases for which there is no
present cure. Although there have been drugs whose benefits have
been outweighed by their detrimental effects, for each failure, there
have been numerous successes. The hands of science should not be tied
to the loadstone of strict liability.
The standard of comment k encourages innovation and research
while requiring that manufacturers properly produce and market
their products with adequate warnings as to their deleterious effects.
Only when these standards are shown to have been breached should
liability be imposed. Since drug manufacturers are held to a standard
of reasonable care, it is apparent that the full range of negligence
defenses, including the state-of-the-art defense, should continue to be
available in pharmaceutical product liability cases. Any application of
Beshada to drug cases would extend the holding beyond its limits and
would be inconsistent with the special rules developed to govern
drugs.
As the law in New Jersey now stands, the same standard of strict
liability is applied whether a product is improperly designed or manu4. Phase I Clinical Testing. This is the first of three sequential tests of a
proposed new medicine in humans, all of which are monitored by the FDA. A
medicine is given to healthy volunteers in order to discover any evidence of its
toxicity in humans.
5. Phase II Clinical Testing. These tests are designed to evaluate the therapeutic values of a new medicine. It is estimated that only half of the initial clinical
testings produce results which warrant advancing to this stage.
6. Phase III Clinical Testing. In this phase, large scale human tests are conducted to uncover as yet unanticipated side effects of the proposed new medicine.
Only some 19 percent of new chemical entities proceed to this phase of testing.
7. Long-Term Animal Studies. These studies are designed to determine the
effects of prolonged exposure to the new chemical entity and its effects on subsequent
generations.
8. New Drug Application (NDA) Approval.
Hansen, The PharmaceuticalDevelopment Process: Estimates of Development Costs and the
Effects of Proposed Regulatory Changes, IssuEs IN PHARMACEUTICAL ECON. 425 (1975).
"I See V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? (1974). The death rate from pneumonia, tuberculosis,
and influenza declined after the introduction and wide use of penicillin, sulfonomide, and
streptomycin. Id. New drugs have also been effective in combating polio, measles, and typhoid,
thus decreasing the death rate from these diseases. Id.
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factured or whether inadequate instruction or warnings are provided
to ensure safe usage. In attempting to develop a theory of strict
liability free from references to negligence, the court has moved
toward absolute liability veiled in the policy rationale of strict liability. Courts and consumers have let it be known that the manufacturing community must pay close attention to the safety of manufactured
products. Greater efforts to openly warn of limitations and dangers
are now being demanded, and failure to meet this duty will be met by
the imposition of liability to compensate those injured. While a miscarriage of the manufacturing process may be a proper risk to allocate
to the maker, it is not equally clear that a scientifically unknowable
risk should be imputed. This standard holds a manufacturer to a
burden of clairvoyance and is tantamount to the imposition of insurer's liability-a standard beyond the purview of strict liability.
Robert D. Towey

